The paper re-examines Sweden's price level targeting during the 1930s which is regarded as a precursor of today's inflation targeting. According to conventional wisdom the Riksbank was the first central bank to adopt price level targeting as the guideline for its activities, although in practice giving priority to exchange rate stabilisation over price level stabilisation. On the basis of econometric analysis (Bayesian VAR) and the evaluation of new archival sources we come to a more skeptical conclusion. Our results suggest that it is hard to reconcile the Riksbank's striving for a fixed exchange rate with the claim that it adopted price level targeting. This finding has implications for the prevailing view of the 1930s as a decade of great policy innovations.
Introduction
Sweden's monetary policy during the 1930s is one of the most fascinating episodes in Europe's economic history of the twentieth century. In late September 1931, when Sweden suspended the gold standard, the Finance Minister made the public statement that from now on monetary policy would be aimed at stabilizing the internal price level, and judging from the record, the goal was achieved rather successfully. It is also impressive to see how intensely contemporaries were debating monetary policy during those years. Eminent economists such as Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin were participating in this public discussion.
Because of the remarkable statement by the Finance Minister and because Sweden recovered more rapidly from the depression than most other European countries, its monetary policy has repeatedly been invoked as a new model, most enthusiastically by Irving Fisher (1935) . In recent times, it has also been cited as a sort of precursor of today's inflation targeting (Svensson 1995 , Bernanke et al. 1999 . In this paper, we examine the question of whether or not the Swedish central bank (Riksbank) was in fact targeting the price level.
Surprisingly, inspite of an ongoing admiration for Sweden's record during the 1930s, this question has only rarely been studied systematically. Most economists or economic historians content themselves with making a short reference to this episode. Besides contemporary scholars who wrote a series of studies only Lars Jonung and his collaborators have seriously approached the topic (Jonung 1979a , 1979b , Berg and Jonung 1999 , Fregert and Jonung 2004 . 1 This new research has led to a strong revision of Fisher's enthusiastic view. Jonung and Fregert (2004) acknowledge that the Riksbank became 'the first and so far the only central bank to have adopted price stabilisation or price level targeting as the guideline for its activities'. But they also point out that the Riksbank 'appears to have given priority to exchange rate stabilisation over price stabilisation'.
Based on new econometric and narrative evidence, we propose a different revision of This finding has implications for the prevailing view of the interwar years as a decade of great policy innovations. Obviously, even in Sweden, where eminent economists came up with original and far-sighted ideas, policy makers were reluctant to abandon the notion that there was no alternative to a fixed exchange rate regime. The paper standard was regarded as a temporary measure, but not as a great opportunity to pursue a more autonomous monetary policy. The most important argument in favor of a conservative approach was that the exporting sectors would be negatively affected by a floating exchange rate. Only in the last quarter of the twentieth century, this conviction gave way to a more positive view towards exchange rate flexibility.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two gives a survey of the exchange rate regimes adopted by Sweden and its Scandinavian neighbors. Section three summarises the official declarations which are the basis for the claim that the Riksbank in fact adopted price level targeting. Sections four and five present our new econometric and narrative evidence. The paper ends with a short conclusion.
Scandinavian monetary policy during the interwar years
To capture the basic features of Swedish monetary policy during the interwar years, we first consider the Scandinavian context. 2 As for most countries, the monetary history of Denmark, Norway and Sweden during the interwar period can be divided into four phases corresponding to different international monetary regimes ( Figure 1 ). 3 In the first phase, beginning in 1919 and characterised by floating exchange rates, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were trying to bring their currencies back to the gold standard at the prewar parity.
The three countries, however, considerably varied with respect to the point of time at which they achieved this goal. Sweden was first, the krona was tied back to gold in April 1924, one year before Great Britain took this step. Denmark and Norway experienced more problems, mainly because of a particularly severe banking crisis in the early 1920s. The de jure restoration of the gold standard occurred in Denmark in January 1927, and in Norway in May 1928.
[ Figure 1 about here]
The second period lasted from the restoration of the gold standard until its fall in September 1931. All three Scandinavian countries followed the devaluation of the pound within days.
For Denmark, the main reason was the high share of exports to the British market. No less than 60 percent of Danish agricultural products were shipped to the British ports. Norway's decision to suspend the gold standard was motivated by the importance of sterling for the shipping business. For the Swedish Riksbank, the main problem was of financial nature. In the course of 1930, some Swedish commercial banks had accumulated a substantial foreign short-term deficit in order to provide liquidity to Ivar Kreuger. When the German banking crisis broke out in July 1931 triggering a general rush for liquidity, the banks covered their foreign short-term deficit by buying exchange reserves from the central bank. Accordingly, when the British pound was devalued and another attack on the krona was launched, the Riksbank had too few reserves to defend the old parity.
In the third phase, lasting from fall of 1931 to summer of 1933, the currencies were officially floating. The Scandinavian countries chose different paths. Denmark engineered a competitive devaluation in January 1933 after New Zealand, its main competitor in the British market for agricultural products, had done so. When suspending the gold standard the Norwegian and Swedish authorities declared that they would aim at stabilizing the purchasing power of the currency. In Sweden, this decision was followed by concrete steps:
the Riksbank constructed a new consumer price index, while the government, the Riksdag and several eminent economists extensively discussed monetary policy matters in public. In
Norway, by contrast, the official statement of September 1931 was not followed by the elaboration of a new framework.
The fourth phase began with the decision of all three Scandinavian countries to tie their currencies to sterling. The peg lasted from July 1933 to the outbreak of World War II: the Danish krone was 23 percent above the old sterling parity, the Norwegian krone ten percent, and the Swedish krona seven percent. The peg was questioned a few times. In 1935, Danish farmers were demanding a second competitive devaluation, and in late 1936, some Swedish economists pleaded a revaluation of the currency after British wholesale prices had increased over several months. In the end, however, the pegs were maintained at the same parity.
The official declarations
The claim that the Riksbank adopted price level targeting after the suspension of the gold standard in September 1931 rests on two pillars. The first one is the relative price stability [ Figure 2 about here]
The second pillar consists of a series of official declarations and reports. It all started on Sunday evening, 27 September 1931, when Finance Minister Felix Hamrin of the ruling center-right coalition declared that from now on 'monetary policy should be aimed at stabilizing the internal purchasing power of the krona by all means possible'. 4 The statement, based on ideas of Knut Wicksell and partly drafted by Swedish economists, was supposed to reassure the public that the authorities would prevent inflation after the suspension of the gold standard. Hamrin also declared that Sweden wanted to return to the gold standard as soon as possible. The departure from gold was seen as a temporary measure.
Hamrin's short sentence soon became the basis for an intense debate among politicians, central bankers and economists. The Riksbank responded to the new situation by sending a detailed questionnaire to three eminent Swedish economists, Gustav Cassel, David
Davidson and Eli Heckscher. 5 In their answers, returned at the end of October, they agreed on a number of issues. In particular, they all recommended postponing the restoration of the gold standard as long as international financial markets were in turmoil, and favored stabilizing prices at the current level, stressing that the exchange rate should not be fixed, but be used to achieve this goal. 6 Also in October, the Riksbank constructed a new consumer price index on a weekly basis in order to have a more accurate picture of the dynamics of price movements. Finally, on 11 February 1932, the Riksbank explained in a letter requesting the government to renew the provisional suspension of the gold standard how it interpreted the new monetary program. 7 Its intention, the Board wrote, was to stabilise the average level of domestic consumer prices, but it also pointed out that it would allow a moderate increase of the Riksbank's price index within a certain range insofar as it was caused by external movements such as rising import and export prices or appreciating foreign exchange rates, whereas an increase of the price index caused by domestic inflation would not be tolerated. The Board also emphasised that indicators other than price indices were being taken into consideration, particularly conditions affecting productivity and stocks in various industries.
As the Riksbank was under the direct control of both houses of the Swedish parliament (Riksdag), politicians of all parties began to be involved into the debate. 8 The Banking Of course, all three of Rooth's statements are ex-post assessments. But there is sufficient evidence suggesting that his memory did not distort the past in a fundamental way. Other archival sources confirm that the Riksbank's main concern was to have a stable sterling parity, and it reached this goal by following the policy of the Bank of England and by first accumulating and then actively managing foreign exchange reserves. Certainly, Rooth was also concerned about prices, but drawing from his experience during the gold standard period, he was convinced that only a stable exchange rate could provide a reliable nominal anchor and thus guarantee price stability in the long run. The domestic purchasing power of the krona, he stated shortly after the suspension of the gold standard, was 'certainly not a sufficiently firm foothold'. 18 Thus, he appears to have made an honest statement when explaining that the Riksbank had practiced a fairly conservative central banking policy.
As for the setting of discount rates, the minutes of the Board show that the Riksbank wanted to make sure the Swedish rate would never fall below the British one, and it was only ready to lower it when the Bank of England took the same step (figure 4). The only time the Board acted on its own was in the aftermath of the suspension of the gold standard in September 1931. On 8 and 19 October, it cut the discount rate from eight to six percent, whereas the Bank of England kept it at six percent. These decisions, however, were not the expression of an independent course, but resulted from the insight that in order to contain inflation after a steep depreciation of the krona it was not necessary to have such a high interest rate. 19 The
Riksbank had decided to increase the discount rate from six to a record high of eight percent on 27 September, i.e. on the same day Finance Minister Hamrin announced the suspension of the gold standard and made his famous statement on the future course of Sweden's monetary policy. The exceptionally high interest rate was part of the campaign to reassure the public that the authorities would not allow inflation to emerge and investors to speculate against the krona.
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A clear sign that Rooth consciously avoided stepping out of line with British policy is his opposition to a discount rate cut on 14 January 1932. 21 One member of the Board proposed it because Swedish business leaders had protested against the restrictive policy for some time, but Rooth prevailed with his cautious approach. Only when the Bank of England lowered its rate from six to five percent on 18 February, he was ready to relax monetary conditions, though still reluctantly, for he wrote to London on the same day that he was very surprised by the British decision and asked ironically: 'What has happened? Has any of the Indian maharadjas sent you all their gold, are you preparing a conversion of the Warloan or have you decided to follow the suggestion made in the last copy of The Economist, viz. to "reflate" the prices to the level of 1928?' 22 Due to his mistrust against expansionary policies, Rooth proposed to follow the Bank of England only halfway to 5.5 percent and to wait for the consequences. 23 Two weeks later, with the fear of inflation diminishing, the Riksbank lowered the discount rate by another half percent in order to bring it down to the British level -the reference to the Bank of England being a crucial argument. 24 In the following months, the Riksbank continued to follow the British policy, although with some time lag. From March to June, the Bank of England cut the discount rate from five to two percent, the Riksbank lowered it to 3.5 percent in the second and third quarter of 1932 and to 2.5 percent in the course of the following year. Again, the decisions were inspired by the policy of the Bank of England. 25 As for the management of the exchange rate, again Rooth's memory proved to be accurate.
Only in the immediate aftermath of the suspension of the gold standard, the Riksbank was hesitating to seek an exchange rate peg since the situation remained chaotic for some weeks.
Rooth considered the stabilisation of the domestic price level only as a temporary policy to prevent inflation and to reassure the public. His next goal was to tie the krona to sterling as soon as the future path of British monetary policy would take shape. Accordingly, that the moment for a sterling peg had come. His decision was motivated by a rapid fall of the krona against sterling from late October on (figure 5). According to the minutes of the Board Rooth had strong reservations against exchange rate fluctuations and was afraid of speculative attacks against a weakening krona. 28 A close friend of his, who endorsed the sterling peg, believed that 'now the British pound plays the role of gold'. 29 On 18
November, Rooth got the approval of the Board, informed the Bank of England, and then turned to the commercial banks for help, because the Riksbank was still suffering from the depletion of its foreign exchange reserves following the defense of the gold standard two months earlier. 30 He convinced them to ration their credits on a voluntary basis in order to improve the trade balance and to impede speculation against the krona. 31 Whether or not the agreement with commercial banks stabilised the exchange rate is hard to say, but it almost certainly hampered the recovery of the economy (Lester 1939 ). In any case, the krona only temporarily fell below the old sterling parity. Rooth succeeded in implementing his exchange rate stabilisation scheme.
[ Figure 5 about here]
Thus, only two months after the declaration by the Finance Minister and a few weeks after the exchange with the economists about a new monetary policy, the Riksbank violated the new guidelines by seeking a sterling peg at the old parity. The maneuver reversed the recovery of wholesale prices and subsequently would have depressed Swedish consumer prices if the Kreuger crash in March 1932 had not forced the Riksbank to be more expansionary. 32 Accordingly, the maneuver was not well received by the press and the political authorities. 33 In reaction to the widespread criticism, the Riksbank tried to reassure the government of its loyalty by adding a few paragraphs in the upcoming formal request for another renewal of the provisional suspension of the gold standard. As mentioned above, these lines written on 11 February 1932 have been cited as an expression of its commitment to price level targeting. Yet, a closer reading of this key text reveals that the Riksbank, while endorsing the overall goal of price stability, gave only lukewarm support to the new guidelines by pointing out that 'for the time being each monetary program can only be valid until further notice'. 34 Consequently, the Banking Committee of the Riksdag was not entirely satisfied with the explanation of the Riskbank and sent a questionnaire while preparing its famous May report cited above. 35 The Committee also tried to make sure that by spelling out a more specific monetary program and openly criticizing the deflationary bias of the Riksbank it could better control its policy. The result of this endeavor was negative, however. By introducing the phrase that monetary policy should not only be aimed at stabilizing the domestic price level, but also be based based on 'the needs of the economy', the monetary program became fuzzy. They also blurred the lines by stating that monetary policy should not be schematically bound to any special price index. And in any case, further events would show that the wishes of the deputies were not particularly relevant for the Board of the Riksbank.
The Kreuger crash in mid-March 1932 forced the Riksbank to step in as lender of last resort and triggered a selling wave of krona assets. The Riksbank tried to defend the old sterling parity, but due to the lack of foreign exchange reserves, it had to give up its resistance. 36 The exchange rate regime remained the same, however: in May, when the storm was over, In any case, besides the obvious violation of the Banking Committee's opposition to an exchange rate peg, the crucial question is whether the krona was pegged to sterling in order to fulfill the monetary program or in order to stabilise the exchange rate for its own sake. As to advance the recovery of the exporting sectors by stabilizing the exchange rate, first at the old parity, then at an undervalued level.
Econometric evidence
To test the qualitative evidence from the previous section, we run a Bayesian VAR covering the period from 1920 to 1939. In contrast to the traditional structural VAR, the Bayesian approach allows for time varying parameter matrices and heteroscedasticity, thus enabling us to analyse monetary policy across regime changes not only in terms of changes in the transmission mechanism, but also in terms of a change in the nature of the structural shocks.
In particular, we can observe whether or not the end of the gold standard in 1931
represented such a change. The set-up of the model is explained in the Appendix.
The crucial question is whether the Riksbank was trying to stabilize the price level after 1931 as official declarations suggest or whether it continued to target the sterling rate as under the gold standard regime lasting from 1924 to 1931. We are aware of the fact that these two strategies need not to be mutually exclusive. It is possible that the central bank was stabilizing the domestic price level by maintaining a sterling peg. The evidence assembled in the last section suggests, however, that the Riksbank was primarily targeting the exchange rate and not the domestic price level. In some periods, the stable sterling rate also delivered price stability, but when in 1936-37 a conflict of interest emerged, the Riksbank was ready to accept an increase of domestic prices violating the principles of price level targeting.
The selection of the variables is straightforward. The Riksbank's monetary policy is measured by the discount rate and alternatively the monetary base. We consider both series because the Riksbank is not changing its discount rate after 1933 anymore as figure 4 shows. All data are on a monthly basis.
The main results displayed in Figures 3.1 to 3 .8 show the posterior distributions of impulse responses (lag 3, lag 6, lag 9, and lag 12). The 95% highest posterior density intervals (lag 3 lag 6, and lag 12) can be found in Tables 1 and 2 . In conclusion, econometric evidence demonstrates that the basic orientation of Sweden's monetary policy remained constant throughout the interwar years and that the Riksbank did not adopt price level targeting in the 1930s. Its main priority was to maintain a stable exchange sterling rate by following the discount rate policy of the Bank of England. Thus, the Bayesian VAR strongly supports the main findings drawn from the narrative sources.
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Conclusion
In the 1930s, Sweden's monetary policy was admired for its success in stabilizing the domestic price level after 1931 while most other European countries needed more time to dig themselves out of the deflationary spiral. According to Irving Fisher the success was due to a regime change in 1931: instead of targeting the exchange rate, Riksbank from now on aimed its policy at stabilizing consumer prices, similarly like today's inflation targeters.
Since the publication of Jonung (1979a) this positive view has been revised. In particular, the belief that the Riksbank fully abandoned exchange rate targeting in favor of price level targeting has been rejected. Yet, inspite of this strong skepticism towards the actual practice, the new conventional view still claims that the Riksbank truly adopted price level targeting which imposed certain restrictions on its monetary policy.
In this paper, we try to show that this view is inconsistent. By employing a Bayesian VAR and analyzing new archival sources we have come to the conclusion that the Riksbank not only gave priority of exchange rate stabilisation over price level stabilisation, but also never intended to adopt price level targeting. As governor Ivar Rooth himself repeatedly pointed out in private letters, his aim was to have stable exchange rates in order to foster trade and to have a strong anchor for monetary policy. Following this conviction stemming from his experience during the gold standard period before and after World War I, he did not hesitate to violate the principles of price level targeting when he believed that the exchange rate needed to be stabilised.
This finding raises the question as to what extent the 1930s were a defining moment in
Europe's monetary history. Sweden has often been cited as an important example of how some policy makers broke with the past. We already know that fiscal policy was much less counter-cyclical and innovative than many observers originally thought. 47 The results of this paper suggest that the same is true for monetary policy. The Riksbank could have pursued a more flexible monetary policy, but it did not even try because policy makers regarded floating exchange rates as harmful to trade and investment. 1. Draw α t conditional on b t , σ t , t=1,…,T, and the variance-covariance matrix Q (the variance-covariance matrix for the structural shocks ε t is fixed to be an identity matrix, see equations 2 and 4). Draws for which the VAR turns out to be unstable are rejected. The prior distribution for α t is independent normal, with expected value and variance covariance matrix coming from an OLS estimation of a time-constant VAR based on the first 50 observations.
2. Generate b t conditional on α t , σ t , t=1,…,T, and the variance-covariance matrix S.
The prior distribution of b t is independent normal; the expected value comes from the lower triangular component of an LDL-decomposition of the error variancecovariance matrix of the OLS estimation in step 1, and the variance covariancematrix is set to the identity matrix.
3. Generate σ t conditional on α t , b t , t=1, …,T, and the variance-covariance matrix W.
The prior distribution for log σ t is also independent normal, with an expected value coming from the diagonal component of an LDL-decomposition of the error variance covariance matrix of the OLS estimation in step 1, and the variance covariance-matrix is set to the identity matrix.
For step 1 to 3, the conditional posteriors turn out to be normal. In each case, the underlying model is a state-space model (e.g., Harvey 1992), and the sequence of time varying parameters is generated following the multi-move Gibbs sampling approach proposed by Carter and Kohn (1994).
4. In the last step, the variance-covariance matrices Q, S, and W are drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution, conditional on α t , b t , σ t , t=1,…,T. The parameters of the inverted Wishart prior for Q come from the OLS estimation in step 1, and for S and W, they are set to I×1e-2.
The entire procedure is repeated 60000 times, and the first 10000 draws are discarded. After burn-in, we keep every 10 th realization of the chain. To judge convergence of the chain, we calculated the Geweke's [ Figure 6 about here]
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It is straightforward to calculate the distribution of the impulse-response matrix at lag j and time t from the distribution of the VAR-parameters and the stochastic volatilities (note that since the lag is set to one, we have just one parameter matrix): | x) is the posterior distribution of β (see e.g. Koop 2003, p. 43-45) . We calculate the highest posterior density intervals using the modified percentile method (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, p. 763-769) . 47 See for example Gourevitch (1986) and Notermans (2000) . 48 See Straumann (2006) for a comparison of small European states. 49 To calculate the test statistic, the Matlab functions moment.g and apm.g provided by James LeSage in his econometrics toolbox were used (http://www.spatial-econometrics.com/). All the other Matlab code was written by Alexander Rathke, Samad Sarferaz, and Ulrich Woitek.
